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The past decade has seen a proliferation of new forms of financial 
information which users have presumably relied upon to make investment 
d . . 1 ec1s1ons. To enhance the credibility of this new information, 
auditors were encouraged by management, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the accounting profession and others to render assurance on 
it. This presented the accounting profession with a perplexing 
problem. It was either impossible or impractical for the new 
information to be audited in the conventional sense of the word. Hence, 
of necessity, the assurance given on these types of information would 
have to be of a limited nature. The profession was faced with a 
choice. It could continue adherence to the traditional role of the 
attest function and refuse engagements that did not allow an opinion 
audit based on Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS). This 
choice would involve the possibility of a substantial loss of revenue. 
Alternatively, the profession could expand the parameters of the attest 
function to {nclude provisions for different levels of assurance based 
on different types of financial information. This choice would increase 
the potential liability for accounting firms. The profession embarked 
on the latter course of action. The continued expenditure of scarce 
resources on limited assurance engagements is direct evidence of its 
usefulness. 
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Limited assurance engagements (LAEs) have contributed to the growth 
of auditing practice in two significant ways. First, accounting firms 
have been better able to meet the demands of existing clients through 
the availability of expanded services. Second, LAEs have allowed public 
accounting firms the flexibility to offer alternative services to 
companies that, for one reason or another, were not in the market for a 
standard opinion audit. The revenues generated by LAEs represent a 
steadily increasing portion of the fee structure of public accounting 
firms. It is anticipated that LAEs will continue to constitute an 
important area of growth for the profession, 
The significance of LAEs is also reflected by professional 
standards, which currently recognize and provide guidance for twenty 
different limited assurance engagements. (See Appendix A for a 
comprehensive list of these engagements.) 
The nature of limited assurance engagements is such that no uniform 
level of assurance can be imputed to all LAEs. Presumably, the intended 
level of assurance will be some function of the scope of auditor 
involvement, nature of the subject matter, materiality level, risk, 
etc. But analysis of existing standards reveals no guidelines as to how 
auditors and users are expected to infer what level of assurance is 
being rendered. 
This raises the concern that users may not understand what can 
reasonably be accomplished by a process less extensive than an audit. 
Consequently, users may be harboring unrealistic views of the various 
levels of assurance being given. Representatives of the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) have expressed concern 
that users do not differentiate among LAEs in the intended fashion. 
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Other members of the profession have expressed concern that users place 
unwarranted reliance on the information and this may result in CPA 
exposure to criticism and loss of credibility (Hicks, 1976; Milburn, 
1980). In the words of Carmichael (1974) 
Doubts about the ability of users to distinguish among 
different forms of assurance have slowed acceptance by 
auditors of the concept of levels of assurance. Many fear 
that users might not recognize the distinctions and would 
assume that the auditor was accepting the same degree of 
responsibility as he does for audited annual financial 
statements (p. 69). 
Similar concerns have been voiced by members of user groups, as 
exemplified by McGarraugh (1978), senior vice-president of a major U.S. 
bank and chairman of the Robert Morris Associates Accounting Policy 
Committee. 
If users do, in fact, misperceive the assurance intended by 
auditors, decision makers may be making sub-optimal decisions. A 
potential consequence of this misperception has been succinctly 
expressed by Bailey (1978, p. 30), "Misunderstanding of the extent of 
the professional responsibility assumed by the auditor will undoubtedly 
lead to the courtroom for resolution of the problem." Numerous 
discussions with audit partners have indicated this is of real concern 
to their firms. 
The purpose of this study is to introduce empirical evidence useful 
in assessing whether users misperceive the assurance intended by the 
auditor when issuing different limited assurance reports. An experiment 
was conducted using auditors and bankers as subjects. Bankers were 
selected to represent the user group because they have been identified 
in the literature as important users of limited assurance reports. The 
subjects were asked to rate the similarity of the assurance intended by 
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the auditor when issuing eight different limited assurance reports. 
Multidimensional scaling (MDS) was used to generate perceptual models 
depicting how the auditors and bankers distinguish among LAEs. The MDS 
algorithm used in this study, Common Space Analysis (COSPA) represents 
an improvement over MDS algorithms used in previous accounting research 
in two ways. First, it generates a statistical test of whether the data 
fit the model. Second, COSPA facilitates an analysis to measure any 
differences in perception between and within two groups. 
The research reported in this paper provides information which will 
be useful to auditing policy makers who appear to be operating under the 
assumptions that (1) increased auditor association results in increased 
financial information reliability; and (2) this increased reliability is 
being adequately communicated to users. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter two 
discusses limited assurance engagements and reviews prior research. The 
research questions, description of the experiment, and details of the 
methodology are contained in chapter three. Chapter four presents the 
results of the experiment and includes a discussion of the findings. A 
summary and recommendations are found in chapter five, along with 
limitations of the study. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. Examples include interim financial statements, internal control 
reports, financial forecasts, supplementary information and 
unaudited financial statements. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LIMITED ASSURANCE ENGAGEMENTS AND PRIOR RESEARCH 
Limited Assurance Engagements 
The services provided in limited assurance engagements are more 
limited in scope than those that are conducted for an opinion audit 
based on Generally Accepted Auditing Standards. LAEs encompass a 
disparate group of engagements. In some instances, assurance is given 
on financial representations other than basic annual financial 
statements, i.e. forecasts. While in other cases, assurance is given on 
hasic financial statements; however, the assurance is less than that 
provided by a GAAS-based opinion audit, i.e. reviews. 
LAEs can also be characterized as those engagements where it is 
either impossible or impractical to perform a traditional audit. The 
former is illustrated by engagements to report on a system of internal 
control. Typically, these engagements include a study of the design of 
the internal control system and an assessment of the system's ability to 
achieve its objectives. It is difficult to conceive of "verifying the 
balance" of an internal control system. Interim financial statements 
are a.n example where it would be impractical to conduct a standard 
GAAS-based opinion audit. Time and cost considerations would 
necessitate some form of assurance less than that afforded by a standard 
opinion audit. 
Although LAEs are quite diverse, there are some implicit underlying 
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concepts. In a study commissioned by the Canadian Institute of 
Chartered Accountants, Milburn (1980) discusses the concept of levels of 
assurance: 
Audit assurance may be defined in terms of the degree to 
which an audit effort increases the credibility of specified 
representations of others--or, alternatively, the extent 
to which it reduces the risk of material errors in the 
representations (p. 123). 
The implication is that distinct levels of assurance exist, each of 
which lends an incremental degree of reliability to a particular 
representation. 
The Cohen Commission (see AICPA 1979) has also recognized that 
differing levels of assurance exist: 
The assurance provided by different forms of association is 
difficult for users to understand and for auditors to describe 
because it is not now possible to quantify or evaluate the 
difference in assurance provided by audits, reviews, or 
other forms of association. However, a sunple ranking can 
be made. This is, an audit provides more assurance than a 
review, and a review more than other forms of association 
with unaudited information (p. 65). 










( . · 1 . 1) i.e. compi ation (i.e. GAAS-based 
opinion audit) 
RANGE OF POSSIBLE 
LEVELS OF ASSURANCE 
Figure 1. Continuum of Levels of Assurance (not 
necessarily to scale) 
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Intuitively, the level of assurance should be related to the scope 
of auditor involvement. However, analysis of professional standards 
indicates similar scopes of audit effort can result in different types 
of reports. Likewise, different scopes of audit effort can result in 
similar reports. Consistenc~, a quality usually important to 
accountants, is not readily apparent. In fact, ev-en a cursory review of 
the existing pronouncements reveals that the standards have been set on 
an ad-hoc basis. This lack of foresight has resulted iri standards that 
are characterized by internal inconsistencies, contradictory 
requirements, and ambiguities. In a position paper on limited assurance 
engagements prepared for the AICPA, Winters (1982) states: 
The standards as a whole do not appear to be based on a 
carefully thought through, clearly developed conceptual 
framework. The diversity of approaches is, at least 
initially, overwhelming and results in inconsistencies and 
lack of clearly defined underlying concepts ••• it seems 
clear that continuation.of a piecemeal approach is 
inappropriate ••• Without a general conceptual framework 
consistently applied in evaluating limited assurance 
engagements, inconsistencies and ambiguities are likely 
to continue (pp. 1, 23). 
Endorsement of a conceptual framework for limited assurance 
engagements is a very appealing panacea. In fact, the AICPA has 
appointed a task force to study LAEs and consider such a framework. 
Unfortunately, the more familiar one becomes with LAEs, the more one 
realizes that the conceptual issues (i.e. auditability) related to LAEs 
are complex. 
Considering the importance of LAEs, as indicated by the emphasis in 
the authoritative literature and the formation of an AICPA task force, 
there is surprising paucity of related research. To date, there has 
been limited empirical research presented regarding how LAEs are viewed 
by auditors and/or users. 
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Prior Research 
The limited research that has been reported has resulted in 
somewhat ambiguous results. Reckers and Pany (1979) used a repeated 
measures design and found financial analysts perceived an increase in 
the reliability of quarterly information as auditor association 
increased from no association to limited review to quarterly audits •. 
Pany and Smith (1982) again tested financial analysts' perception of the 
reliability of quarterly information with varying forms of auditor 
association. They used a design in which the respondents did not 
explicitly compare the different forms of association. Differences in 
the perceived reliability were found primarily in cases where firms had 
previously released inaccurate quarterly information. 
In a later study, Johnson, Pany and White (1983) studied loan 
officers' perceptions of varying forms of auditor association with 
annual financial statements of nonpublic companies. Using multivariate 
and univariate statistical analysis, they found that audits were 
perceived to be of a higher quality than other forms of auditor 
assurance such as reviews and compilations. Interestingly, they found 
that compilation and review services may be undervalued in terms of how 
much assurance is provided. 
The research thus far has yielded conflicting conclusions. A 
perceived difference in reliability was found when subjects directly 
compared different forms (or levels) of auditor association. However, 
when the subjects compared the different forms of association 
indirectly, differences were perceived only in certain circumstances. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. According to the Statement on Standards for Accounting and Review 
Services 1, a compilation technically provides no assurance. 
However, it has been proposed that some assurance is assumed by 
users from the accountant's association with the financial 
statements. Also, the person or firm performing the compilation 
should be referred to as an accountant not an auditor. For ease 





The Research Questions 
This study addresses the following research questions: 
1) Is there consistency among auditors regarding their 
perception of the assurance intended by the different 
reports? 
2) Is there consistency among bankers regarding their 
perception of the assurance intended by the different 
reports? 
3) What underlying dimensions influence auditors' and 
bankers' perceptions of assurance? 
4) When the auditor issues different limited assurance 
reports, is the assurance intended by the auditor 
consistent with the banker's perception of assurance? 
Methodology 
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Schiffman, Reynolds and Young (1981, p. 3) describe multidimensional 
scaling as a method which can "systemize data in areas where organizing 
concepts and underlying dimensions are not well developed". Since the 
organizing concepts and underlying dimensions of limited assurance 
engagements are still in the developing stage, MDS is an appropriate 
methodology to use in addressing the above research questions. 
In the past, multidimensional scaling has been used as a research 
tool in disciplines such as marketing, psychology and geography. More 
recently, multidimensional scaling has been used to study accounting 
and auditing issues (Rockness and Nikolai, 1977; Libby, 1979; Brown, 
1981). In-depth discussions of the MDS model and related methods are 
provided by Kruskal and Wish (1978) and Carroll and Arabie (1980). 
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Multidimensional scaling is a powerful technique by which 
similarities or dissimilarities between objects can be used to generate 
multidimensional spatial models which depict the perceived relationships 
between objects. MDS is predicated upon the assumption that the 
distance between any two objects in space is a function of the degree of 
the similarity of the objects. As the degree of similarity between 
objects increases, the distance between the objects decreases. 
Conversely, as the degree of similarity between objects decreases, the 
distance between the objects increases. The virtue of MDS lies not in 
its ability to explain perception but rather in its ability to represent 
(or model) perception. 
An example will assist in gaining an intuitive understanding of 
MDS. Prior to the 1968 Presidential election, Johnson (1969) asked 
subjects to compare the similarity of the political candidates. 
Subjects rated each possible pair of candidates in terms of the 
candidate similarity on a scale from one to nine (where l=very similar, 
9=not similar). The similarity ratings were the input for the MDS 
computer algorithm. The MDS algorithm plotted the candidates on two 
dimensions based on the subjects' similarity ratings. The 
multidimensional representation obtained is called a perceptual model. 
The perceptual model represents the subjects' perceptions of the 
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Figure 2. Multidimensional Scaling Solution 
for Candidate Similarity 
I 
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Analysis of the perceptual model indicated the subjects appeared to 
have based their judgment on two aspects of the candidates. The 
horizontal axis was interpreted as a liberal vs. conservative 
dimension. The vertical axis was interpreted as reflecting perceived 
favorability of attitude toward government involvement in domestic and 
international matters. 
Libby (1979) used MDS in an accounting context. He applied MDS to 
study auditors' and bankers' perception of the message communicated by 
the audit report. The subjects were asked to compare the similarity of 
ten standard audit reports containing scope limitations and uncertainty 
qualifications. The similarity rating of each possible pair of reports 
was made on a ten-point scale (where O=least similar, 9=most similar). 
The similarity ratings were the input to the MDS algorithm, Individual 
Differences Scaling (INDSCAL). INDSCAL generated perceptual models of 
the perceived differences in the messages intended by the audit 
reports. Three separate models were constructed, one for the auditors, 
one for the bankers, and one for all subjects.. Visual analysis and 
application of property-fitting techniques resulted in an interpretable 
two-dimensional solution. Libby found 
The first (horizontal) dimension seems to split the reports 
into three groups, depending on whethe.r the report is 
unqualified, qualified, or a disclaimer ••• This suggests that 
dimension 1 is primarily related to the need for additional 
information ••• The second (vertical) dimension separates the 
reports into three groups on the basis of the type of limita-
tion on the audit: (1) no limitation, (2) circumstance-
imposed limitation, and (3) client-imposed limitation ••• one 
could infer that the dimension relates to the source of the 
limitation on the auditor's ability to make a judgment (p. 116). 
Libby concluded that subjects did not differentiate between 
circumstances resulting in an uncertainty report (asset realization 
versus litigation), but they did distinguish between circumstance-
14 
imposed versus client-imposed scope limitations. The reliability of the 
financial statement information was viewed as impaired when the scope 
limitation was client-imposed. Libby also found that no significant 
differences existed in the auditors' and bankers' perceptions of the 
reports. 
Horan' s Model 
The particular MDS model assumed in this study and the computer 
algorithm used are discussed next. Horan (1969) introduced a 
particularly strong individual difference model for multidimensional 
scaling. This model made an important contribution to MDS because 
it allowed isolation of information connnon to all individuals from 
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information unique to each individual. Horan's model proposed that the 
common information is captured in an m-dimensional common Euclidean 
space while the unique information is reflected by differential weights 
associated with each dimension. Accordingly, accurate perceptual models 
can be generated for objects even when individuals weigh the underlying 
dimensions differently. Horan's model postulates that the observed 
distances between objects can be depicted as: 
B = A D2 A' 
k k = 1 • • • N 
where 
B the matrix of squared observed differences between objects, 
A= the p X m coordinate matrix of the p objects in m-space, 
D = the subject specific, diagonal weight matrix, and 
N = the number of subjects. 
Schonemann (1972) presented an exact algebraic solution for Horan's 
model which revealed a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. The 
two conditions which must be met by the data for the model to hold are 
cornmon space and diagonality. 
The common space condition addresses the question of intersubject 
consistency. Specifically, it asks whether there is sufficient 
agreement among subjects, regarding the object interrelationships, to 
obtain a meaningful model of perception. An example will assist in 
understanding the common space condition. Suppose you were to ask 
subjects to rate the similarity of different size circles. Subjects 
would differ in their perceptions of the radius and area (probable 
dimensions) of the circles. But the subjects would have enough common 
agreement about the concept of a circle to allow meaningful comparisons 
to be made. The cornmon space condition would be met and the MDS model 
generated would be a meaningful representation of the subjects' 
perception of the circles. 
In contrast, suppose you asked subjects to rate the similarity of 
fifteen esoteric words. Little agreement would be present among the 
subjects regarding the meaning of the words. Hence, the common space 
assumption would not be met. Any similarity ratings made of the word 
pairs would represent random noise •. Although an MDS model could be 
generated from the similarity ratings, the model is meaningless. When 
the common space condition is not met, the model generated is not a 
valid representation of the underlying data. It is simply an 
amalgamation of highly individual judgments. 
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The diagonaiity condition addresses the question of the 
orientational invariance of the axes (dimensions). Meeting the 
diagonality condition ensures two things. First, the model guarantees 
the unique orientation of the axes. This obviates the need for rotation 
of the axes. Second, the axes are orthogonal. Thus, the dimensions 
capture independent information and may be interpreted independently of 
each other. Meeting the diagonality condition does not guarantee the 
dimensions will always be interpretable. However, it does mean the 
dimensions have been identified by the data as psychologically 
relevant. When the diagonality condition is not met the dimensions 
usually require rotation. The dimensions obtained are not independent 
and, if interpretable, may contain redundant information. 
Horan's model has been the prototype for many of the scaling 
methods which have been developed. Unfortunately, there has been a 
tendency to assume the conditions of the model hold. For example, the 
authors of INDSCAL, Carroll and Chang (1970), claim that Horan was the 
first author to propose the model they assumed. However, as was later 
shown by Takane, Young and Deleeuw (1975), the INDSCAL model has weaker 
uniqueness properties than Horan's model. The problem lies in that 
Horan's model is a strong model which cannot be expected to fit any and 
all data. To ascertain whether a particular set of data fit the model, 
it is necessary to test both the common space and diagonality 
conditions. INDSCAL uses stress, an overall measure of fit, to assess 
how well the data fits the model. The problem with using an overall 
measure of fit is two-fold. First, an overall measure of fit captures 
violations of the common space condition, but not violations of the 
diagonality condition. As shown in an empirical study by MacCallum 




COSPA is an MDS computer algorithm developed to overcome the 
problems associated with an overall measure of fit (see Schonemann, 
Carter and James (1976) ). COSPA·generates two test indices for each 
subject which can be used 'to test violations of the common space and 
diagonality conditions. The common space condition is addressed by 
calculation of av-statistic. This statistic measures the proportion of 
variance in each individual's coordinate system (model) which can be 
accounted for by the groups' coordinate system (model). A higher 
v-statistic would be preferred to a lower one as this indicates more 
agreement between the individual subject and the group. The diagonality 
condition is addressed by calculation of a delta-statistic for each 
subject. The delta-statistic measures the directional invariance of 
18 
the axes. A lower delta-statistic is preferable to a higher one as this 
indicates the magnitude of the off-diagonal elements of the diagonal 
matrix (D). 
Empirical norms are needed to use these indices to test the fit 
of Horan's model with some stingency. 1 These norms allow meaningful 
empirical results to be distinguished from results which could be 
expected with random data. A Monte Carlo study was conducted to 
obtain approximate norms from random data (see Schonemann et al., 
1976). The norms for the v-statistic and the delta-statistic were 
generated under the null hypothesis that the data are random. For the 
v-statistic, the upper decile (v. 9) was tabulated. For the 
delta-statistic, the lower decile (d_ 1) was tabulated. These empirical 
norms can be compared to the test indices generated by COSPA. 
To test for common .space, the v-statistic for each individual (vk) 
is compared to the empirical norm (v. 9). If the vk is not appreciably 
larger than can be expected for purely random data, then there is no 
justification for claiming the common space condition for the data at 
hand. The probability that any vk will be greater than the randomly 
generated v. 9 is .1. Hence, if vk< v. 9 then the randomness hypothesis 
cannot be rejected at the .1 level for this subject. That is, the 
subject's data do not meet the common space condition. If, however, 
vk) v. 9 then the randomness hypothesis can be rejected at the .1 level 
for this subject. That is, the data for this subject are more consis-
tent with the common space condition than random data. A test of common 
space for the complete group is based on the total number of individual 
.1 level rejections of the randomness hypothesis. Standard binomial 
tables can be used to determine the critical number of rejections 
necessary to achieve the overall desired level of significance. 
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If the common space condition is met, the diagonality condition can 
be tested in an analogous manner. The individual delta-statistic (dk) is 
compared to the empirical norm (d. 1). If the dk is not appreciably 
smaller than that for random data (that is, dk < d_ 1) then there is no 
justification for claiming the diagonality condition. The test of di-
agonality for the complete group is based on the total number of indivi-
duals rejectii;ig the randomness hypothesis. Standard binomial tables can 
be used to determine the number of individual rejections at the .1 level 
necessary to achieve the overall desired level of significance. 
If both the common space and the diagonality conditions are met by 
the data, then Horan's model is a valid representation of the underlying 
data. If only the common space assumption is met, then a weaker MDS 
model must be used. If neither condition is met, then multidimensional 
scaling is not an appropriate method to use in representing the data. 
The Experiment 
The experiment conducted for this study is discussed next. The 
experiment is similar to Libby's, but it considers the similarity of 
different limited assurance reports. 
Subjects 
The subjects participating in the study were twenty-five audit 
partners and twenty-five commercial loan officers. The audit partners 
were from the Chicago offices of five "Big Eight" accounting firms. The 
bankers were from five of the largest commercial lending institutions 
in Chicago. All of the bankers had received formal training in 
accounting. In addition, most of the bankers had participated in a 
credit training program and other accounting-related seminars sponsored 
by their banks. On average, the bankers had over seven years of 
experience. 
Reports 
The objects to be compared in this study consisted of the reports 
issued for different limited assurance engagements. With multi-
dimensional scaling, the required number of pairs of objects which 
must be compared is n(n-1)/2, wher.e n = number of objects. Hence, for 
each additional report, the required number of comparisons increases 
substantially. 
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Five audit partners were interviewed to determine which limited 
assurance reports, based on frequency of occurrence in practice, would 
be reasonably familiar to the subjects. Ten reports, requiring 
forty-five comparisons, were selected for inclusion in a pilot study. 
The subjects for the pilot study, five accounting faculty members, 
indicated it took nearly two hours to complete the comparisons and five 
associated questions (discussed later). The subjects considered this an 
unreasonable time requirement and indicated they lost interest in the 
task because of the length. 
A subsequent pilot study, using twelve auditors and educators as 
subjects, included eight reports. The subjects indicated that it took 
approximately one hour to complete the twenty-eight required comparisons 
and five related questions. Accordingly, because of task manageability 
considerations, only eight reports were included in the study. 
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The latter pilot study included an Interim Review-Public Entity 
report and a report for Interim Review-Nonpublic Entity. The results 
showed no difference in the subjects' perception of the two ·reports. 
Since subjects suggested a Standard Opinion would facilitate comparisons 
of the reports, a Standard Opinion was substituted for the Interim 
Review-Nonpublic Entity report. Figure 3 presents the abbreviated 
titles used to identify the eight reports selected as a result of the 
pilot studies: 
Report 1: Interim Review-Public Entity 
Report 2: Compilation-Nonpublic Entity 
Report 3: Contractual Compliance 
Report 4: Supplementary Information 
Report 5: Standard Opinion 
Report 6: Condensed Financial Statements 
Report 7: Agreed Upon Procedures 
Report 8: Financial Forecasts 
Figure 3. Abbreviated Report Titles 
The reports were taken directly from the applicable authoritative 
literature and are illustrated in Appendix B2• 
Experimental Task 
The experiment was conducted by the researcher in the subjects' 
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office. Each subject received a folder which contained the eight 
limited assurance reports. The subjects were asked to familiarize 
themselves with the reports and to be able to identify the reports by 
the abbreviated titles. Each folder also contained rating sheets which 
listed all twenty-eight possible pairings of the reports. Two different 
random orderings of the pairs were used to reduce any possible order 
effect. 
Part A of the experiment asked the subjects to rate, on a 
nine-point scale, the similarity of the assurance implied by each pair 
of reports. The instructions emphasized that: 1) ties were allowed; 
2) answers could be changed; 3) reports could be referred back to; and 
4) the need to judge conscientiously all twenty-eight pairs. The 
similarity ratings obtained were the input to the MDS algorithm. The 
MDS algorithm generated models of the auditors' and bankers' perceptions 
of assurance. 
Part B of the experiment asked the participants to evaluate each of 
the eight reports on the basis of the following five questions: 
1) For each of the following reports, to what extent did the 
auditor test the accounting records? 
2) For each of the following reports, to what extent does the 
report represent that the accompanying financial information 
does not contain misleading information? 
3) For each of the following reports, to what extent should a 
third party expect to recover a financial loss from the 
auditor if he could prove reliance on the report? 
4) For each of the following reports, to what extent should a 
third party rely upon the report in making a financial 
lending decision? 
5) For each of the following reports, to what extent is the 
underlying information of the report susceptible to 
unintentional misstatement? 
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The results from this part of the experiment were used to assist the 
researcher in identifying the dimensions used by subjects in making 
their similarity judgments. The experimental instrument, including a 
detailed description of the scale endpoints used for the five questions, 
is included in Appendix B. 
After the subjects completed the experimental task, an interview 
was conducted to ascertain the subject's experience level, formal 
training and familiarity with the reports. The subjects were also 
encouraged to discuss how they made their similarity ratings. Finally, 
each subject was asked to rank the eight reports (from first to last) in 
order of how much assurance they felt the report was intended to 
convey. Approximately one hour was spent with each subject. 
ENDNOTES 
1. The discussion of empirical norms relies heavily on Schonemann 
et al. (1976). 
2. Report 7 was developed to be the type of agreed-upon procedures 




Presentation of the Results 
As previously mentioned, the similarity ratings were used as input 
to the MDS computer algorithm, COSPA. The auditors' and bankers' data 
were analyzed separately. COSPA generated the following output for each 
of the two groups of subjects: 
1) v-statistics for each subject, 
2) delta-statistics for each subject, 
3) two-dimensional and three-dimensional perceptual models, and 
4) graphs of the subjects showing how much weight they attached 
to each dimension of the perceptual model. 
The results of the statistical analysis are presented in a manner to 
facilitate consideration of the four research questions identified 
earlier. 
Stage one of the analysis addresses the first two research 
questions: 
1) Is there consistency among auditors regarding their perception 
of the assurance intended by the-different reports? 
2) Is there consistency among bankers regarding their perception 
of the assurance intended by the different reports. 
The common space condition was tested to ascertain whether consistency 
existed among auditors and among bankers regarding their perceptions of 
the.intended assurance. Recall that the v-statistics generated by 
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COSPA represent the proportion of variance in an individual's coordinate 
system which can be accounted for by the groups' model. Each 
individual's v-statistic (vk) is compared to the v-statistic generated 
by the empirical norm (v. 9). When vk> v. 9 , the null hypothesis that 
the data are random is rejected at the .1 significance level. This 
indicates that the data relating to the individual at hand are more 
consistent with the common space condition than random data. Table I 
presents the number and percent of the subjects for which the randomness 
hypothesis is, and is not, rejected. 
TABLE I 
NUMBER AND PERCENT OF SUBJECTS FOR WHICH THE RANDOMNESS 
HYPOTHESIS IS, AND IS NOT, REJECTED FOR THE 
COMMON SPACE CONDITION 
AUDITORS BANKERS 
Number % Number 
Rejection of the null hypothesis 
that the data are random 14 56 14 
Failure to reject the null 




The randomness hypothesis was rejected for 56% of both the auditors' 
and the bankers' sample. The common space test for the complete group is 
based upon the total number of individual rejections. Standard binomial 
tables show the probability level associated with 14 out of 25 rejections 
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to be much less than .001 (p <. .001). That is, there is less than one 
chance in a thousand that the data for the auditors or the bankers could 
have met the common space condition by chance. 
Two conclusions can be made on the basis of meeting the common 
space condition. First, the perceptual models generated from the 
similarity ratings are not simply amalgams of highly individual 
judgments. Second, the subjects' perceptions can be meaningfully 
represented by multidimensional scaling. The common space test result 
indicates there is consistency regarding perception of assurance by both 
auditors and bankers (within their respective groups). Although it might 
have been expected that the auditors would have a more homogenous under-
standing of assurance concepts, the statistical results did not show 
this. In fact, the significance of the test implies both auditors and 
b~nkers have very well-defined ideas about the assurance implied by the 
different reports. 
Stage two of the analysis considers the third research question: 
What underlying dimensions influence auditors' and 
bankers' perceptions of assurance? 
This question was addressed by testing the diagonality condition and 
analyzing the perceptual models. Recall that the delta-statistic 
measures the directional invariance of the axes (dimensions). Each 
individual's delta-statistic (dk) is compared to the delta-statistic 
generated by the empirical norm (d 01 ). When dk( d.l' the null hypothe-
sis that the data are random is rejected at the .1 significance level. 
This indicates that the data of the individual for which the randomness 
hypothesis is rejected are more consistent with the diagonality condi-
tion than random data. Table II presents the number and percent of the 
subjects for which the randomness hypothesis is, and is not, rejected. 
TABLE II 
NUMBER AND PERCENT OF SUBJECTS FOR WHICH THE RANDO'MNESS 
HYPOTHESIS IS, AND IS NOT, REJECTED FOR 
THE DIAGONALITY CONDITION 
AUDITORS BANKERS 
Number % Number 
Rejection of the null hypothesis 
that the data are random 6 24 7 
Failure to reject the null 
hypothesis 19 76 18 




sample and 28% of the bankers' sample, thereby meeting the diagonality 
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condition at the individual level. The diagonality test for the complete 
group is based on the total number of individual rejections. Standard 
binomial tables show the probability level associated with 6 out of 25 
rejections to be less than .OS (p~.05). That is, there is a less than 5 
out of 100 chance that the auditors' data could have met the diagonality 
condition by chance. Standard binomial tables show the probability level 
associated with 7 out of 25 reject;l..ons to be less than .01 (p < .01). 
That is, there is less than 1 chance out of 100 that the bankers' data 
could have met the diagonality condition by chance. The diagonality test 
result indicates there is a unique orientation of the axes so no rotation 
is necessary. Also, the dimensions capture independent information so 
they may be interpreted_ independently of each other. 
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Separate perceptual models, representing the groups' perception of 
the assurance implied by the different reports, were generated for the 
auditors and the bankers. Two-dimensional and three-dimensional 
solutions were considered. However, the three-dimensional model was 
discarded for two reasons. First, it did not meet the diagonality 
condition for bankers. Second, with COSPA the previous dimensions are 
retained when a higher dimensional solution is generated, In this case, 
visual analysis of the three-dimensional model indicated that the 
additional dimension did not seem to add extra information. Figure 4 
presents the auditors' perceptual model while the bankers' perceptual 
model is presented in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Bankers' Perceptual Model 
The horizontal dimension can be interpreted by comparing how the 
reports are ranked by the model (on this dimension) with the subjects' 
mean rankings of the reports' assurance level. The model ranking 
represents the order (from left to right) in which the reports were 
positioned on the horizontal dimension of the perceptual model. The 
mean ranking was obtained when the subjects were asked to rank the eight 
reports (from first to last) in order of how much assurance they felt 
the report was intended to convey. Table III presents a comparison of 
the two rankings. 
REPORT 
TABLE III 
COMPARISON OF THE MODEL RANKING AND THE MEAN 
RANKING OF THE EIGHT REPORTS 
AUDITORS 
Model Mean Model 
BANKERS 
Mean 
Ranking Ranking Ranking Ranking 
Standard Opinion 1 1 1 1 
Condensed Financial Statements 2 2 2 2 
Contractual Compliance 3 4 5 5 
Agreed Upon Procedures 4 3 6 6 
Interim Review 5 6 3 3 
Supplementary Information 6 5 4 4 
Financial Forecasts 7 7 8 8 
Compilation 8 8 7 7 
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The mean ranking of the reports seems very closely aligned with the 
positioning of the reports on the horizontal dimension. A Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient was calculated to measure the relationship 
between the two rankings. The rank correlation can range from +l (com-
plete concordance) to -1 (complete disconcordance). The rank correla-
tion coefficient for the auditors' sample was .952 and was significant 
at the .01 level (the bankers r =1). Because of the near perfect 
s 
correlation of the rankings, the horizontal dimension can be interpreted 
as reflecting the level of assurance implied by the various reports. 
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The identity of the vertical dimension is less clear. Two reasons 
for this are apparent. First, the dimension is not necessarily the same 
for both auditors and bankers. Second, considerable disagreement 
existed among the subjects regarding the importance of the vertical 
dimension. This was determined by examining a graph indicating how much 
weight the subjects assigned to each dimension when making comparions of 
the reports. The abscissa of the graph was the weight assigned to the 
horizontal dimension of the perceptual model. The ordinate of the graph 
was the weight assigned to the vertical dimension of the perceptual 
model. The subjects were plotted on the graph. The plotting showed the 
subjects attached reasonably uniform weight to the horizontal 
dimension. In contrast, the weight attached to the vertical dimension 
ranged from very low to very high. This indicated a lack of agreement 
among the subjects regarding the importance of the vertical dimension 
when making comparisons of the different reports. 
To assist in identifying the vertical dimension, the researcher 
interviewed three auditors and three bankers who weighted the dimension 
heavily when making their similarity ratings. The auditors suggested 
they distinguished among the reports on the basis of the clarity of 
responsibility they were assuming. This explanation seemed to be 
consistent with the positioning of the reports in the auditors' model. 
The vertical dimension appears to divide the reports in two groups (see 
Figure 4). If a difference exists between the two groups, we would 
expect the Euclidean distance between the centroids to be greater than 
the Euclidean distance between any pair of reports within a group. This 
was found to be true indicating that two distinct groups exist. 
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Group one contains a standard opinion, condensed financial 
statements, financial forecasts and a compilation report. These reports 
reflect a relatively clear-cut indication of the responsibility the 
auditor is assuming. In the case of a standard opinion and condensed 
financial statements, a high level of assurance is implied and the 
auditor is assuming a great deal of responsibility. With a compilation 
report, a low level of assurance is implied and the auditor is assuming 
very little responsibility. The case of a financial forecasts is 
interesting. There is a high degree of implied assurance that the 
forecast has been reviewed in accordance with the guidelines established 
by the AICPA. However, it is generally recognized that no amount of 
testing can create certainty where inherent uncertainty exists. 
Accordingly, the overall level of responsiblity the auditor is assuming 
is relatively low. 
The second group consists of an interim review, agreed upon 
procedures, contractual compliance and .a supplementary information 
report. This group includes reports where the assurance being implied 
and the responsibility being assumed by the auditor is less 
well-defined. With the contractual compliance and agreed upon 
procedures reports, the assurance implied and the responsibility assumed 
varies among engagements, depending on how much work was actually 
performed. In the case of the interim review and supplementary 
information reports, discussions with subjects indicated they had 
varying assessments of the level of assurance being implied and the 
responsibility being assumed for these engagements. 
Discussions with bankers did not lead to a definitive 
interpretation of the bankers' vertical dimension, 
The last stage of the analysis considers the fourth research 
question: 
When the auditor issues different limited assurance reports, 
is the assurance intended by the auditor consistent with the 
bankers' perception of assurance? 
The v-statistics discussed earlier can also be used to assess any 
difference between the two groups' perceptions. 
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Recall that COSPA generated a set of coordinate points for both the 
auditors and the bankers. The set of coordinate points reflects the 
groups' positioning of the reports on the axes. 
The auditors' similarity ratings were reanalyzed using the 
coordinate points of the bankers, resulting in a new set of 
v-statistics. These new v's measure the proportion of the variance in 
the auditors' coordinate system that can be accounted for by the 
bankers' model. An average new v was calculated. This v was compared 
to the average v obtained when scaling the auditors' data with the 
auditors' coordinate points. At-test for related differences was used 
to test the null hypothesis that no difference existed between the 
average v's. A similar process was then followed using the bankers' 
similarity ratings with the auditors' coordinate points. Again, the 
average v's were calculated and tested. Appendix C contains the 
detailed test calculations for the auditors. The bankers' detailed test 
calculations are presented in Appendix D. Table IV (on the following 
page) summarizes the average v-statistics and the t-test calculations. 
The test for a difference in the perception of the two groups was 
significant for auditors and bankers, respectively, p<.001, and 
p ~.01. This evidence indicates there is a definite difference in the 
auditors' and bankers' perception of the assurance intended by the LAEs. 
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TABLE IV 


























Discussion of Findings 
Differences in Subjects' Perceptions 
.488 . 416 
2.95 
p .01 
The statistical tests indicate a significant difference exists 
between the auditors' and bankers' perception of assurance. The 
perceptual models of the two groups were compared to investigate where 
the differences lie. Three sources of difference in the groups' 
perceptions are noticeable. 
First, the auditors seemed to ascribe an appreciably higher level 
of assurance to a financial forecast than did the bankers. This may be 
due to the fact that many of the bankers interYiewed were not familiar 
with the auditor's financial forecast report and the associated 
guidelines. Although their clients frequently provide financial 
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forecasts, these forecasts are rarely accompanied by an auditor's review 
of the forecast. The sentiment that these management-prepared, 
unreviewed forecasts are unreliable was often expressed. Virtually none 
of the bankers were familiar with the guidelines for a review of a 
forecast established by the AICPA~ These guidelines, of, which most 
auditors were aware, require rather extensive auditor involvement. 
However, a reference to such stringent guidelines is the bankers only 
clue of the scope of the work performed. Accordingly, it is not too 
surprising that the bankers perceived forecasts to provide a much lower 
level of assurance than intended by the auditors. 
A second source of difference was that bankers perceived interim 
reviews to provide an appreciably higher level of assurance than did the 
auditors. One explanation for this difference may be that bankers tend 
to see interim review reports more frequently than some of the other 
reports in the study. Because of their greater familiarity with the 
report, the bankers may attribute more assurance to an interim review 
than intended by the auditors. Another explanation for the difference 
may be that bankers are not attuned to the procedures followed during an 
interim review. Bankers generally indicated they thought many of the 
same year-end audit procedures were performed for an interim review. 
Bankers' beliefs are in contrast to professional standards which require 
little substantive testing for interim reviews. 
One further source of difference between the auditors and bankers 
is their perceptions of the vertical dimension. The auditors' vertical 
dimension was related to the clarity of the responsibility assumed by 
the auditor. In contrast, no interpretable solution was identified for 
the bankers' vertical dimension. 
Implications for Levels of Assurance 
Several comments can be made based on the auditors' positioning of 
the reports on the horizontal dimension. However, because of the 
limited number of reports considered in the study, the comments should 
be carefully interpreted. The auditors' horizontal dimension is shown 
below: 
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The medium level of assurance is of most interest. The wording of the 
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reports in this level implies assurance ranging from relatively positive 
limited assurance (for agreed upon procedures and contractual 
compliance) to relatively negative limited assurance (for interim 








Positive limited assurance is expressed for those engagements where 
limited substantive testing of detail was performed. 1 In contrast, 
negative limited assurance is expressed for those engagements where 
review procedures were performed. It seems limited substantive testing 
is perceived to provide more assurance than review procedures. 
Audit assurance was defined earlier as the extent to which an audit 
effort reduces the risk of material errors in a representation. One 
implication from this study is that limited substantive testing is 
perceived to be more effective than review procedures in reducing the 
risk of material errors. Research needs to be conducted to evaluate the 
efficiency of different audit procedures in uncovering material 
2 errors. Such evidence would be helpful in making a meaningful ranking 
of assurance levels. 
Assurance and the Report Type 
Standardized reports are intended to assist in communicating 
information to readers. For limited assurance reports to be effective, 
the reader must understand what assurance is intended to be conveyed. 
Presumably the type of report issued should give some indication of the 
level of assurance intended. Table V summarizes the type of reports 
issued for the limited assurance engagements considered in this study. 
TABLE V 
TYPE OF REPORTS ISSUED FOR THE LIMITED ASSURANCE 
ENGAGEMENTS CONSIDERED IN THIS STUDY 
ENGAGEMENT 
Standard Opinion 
Condensed Financial Statements 
Financial Fore.casts 
Interim Review 
Agreed Upon Procedures 
TYPE OF REPORT ISSUED 
Positive opinion 
Disclaimer with negative 
assurance 
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Supplementary Information Exception report with implicit 
negative assurance 
Compilation Disclaimer with implicit 
negative assurance 
Comparison of the report types with the level of assurance (as 
indicated by the horizontal dimension of the perceptual model) suggests 
no discernable relationship. Analysis of the vertical dimension also 
showed neither auditors nor bankers distinguished among the engagements 
based on the type of report issued. This lack of differentiation calls 
to question the meaningfulness of the various report types. 
Firm Comparisons 
One last result worthy of note pertains to the behavior of the 
individual accounting firms and financial institutions. The graphs 
plotting the individual subject's responses were examined to ascertain 
if any pattern among or within firms emerged. No particular similarity 
in the responses was observed among or within the accounting firms or 
the financial institutions. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. This particular report indicated the work performed was of a 
substantive nature. However, this would not necessarily have 
to be true. 
2. See "Audit Detection of Financial Statement Errors" published 
by Hylas and Ashton (1982) in the Accounting Review. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SUMMARY, LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
' 
Sunnnary 
Limited assurance engagements have become prevalent in response to 
market demands and cost/benefit considerations. Because they are 
expected to play an increasing role in auditing, related research may be 
useful for policy-setting. 
This study investigated auditors' and bankers' perceptions of the 
assurance intended by different LAEs. The results indicated that both 
auditors and bankers (within their respective groups) have a common 
understanding of assurance concepts. Both groups seem to have 
well-defined ideas about levels of assurance. The results also 
indicated that a significant difference exists between the auditors' and 
the bankers' perceptions of assurance. Attitudes toward the assurance 
provided by financial forecasts and interim reviews constituted a major 
source of that difference. 
The auditors seemed to perceive limited substantive testing to 
provide more assurance than review procedures. The type of report 
issued (i.e. positive opinion, negative assurance) was not found to be a 
significant factor in the subjects' perceptions. Also, no similarity in 
perception was noted within or among firms. 
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Limitations of the Study 
Two caveats are usually associated with multidimensional scaling. 
First, MDS will always generate a perceptual model. The problem is that 
sometimes the model is meaningless. This concern is allayed in this 
study because the common space assumption (pertaining to the 
scaleability of the data) was directly tested and found significant. 
Second, it is sometimes difficult to interpret the dimensions. This was 
true with the bankers' vertical dimension, which did not appear to have 
a clear interpretation. 
One further limitation of the study results because of the 
judgmental selection of the subjects. A regional bias may exist because 
all subjects were from the Chicago area. Also, it should be noted 
that bankers represent only one group of users of limited assurance 
reports. Accordingly, the results of this study should not be 
generalized to other groups of users without further study. 
The nature of the subjects raises an interesting thought. The 
Chicago bankers represent a highly sophisticated and educated group of 
users. They evaluate financial information and audit reports on a 
regular basis. This high level of training is not customary for all 
users of limited assurance reports. If even these bankers misperceive 
the auditor's intended assurance, one· has to wonder about the less 
sophisticated user's understanding of assurance. 
One last limitation of the study results because it was exploratory 
in nature. No a priori theory existed to generate testable hypotheses. 
However, several interesting implications for future research emerge. 
The results of the study show a perception gap exists for interim 
review and financial forecast engagements. The question of why arises? 
Is it because the nature and extent of the review procedures performed 
are not well understood? Or is it because the wording and warnings of 
the reports are misperceived? Or, perhaps it is due to the soft nature 
of the underlying information (financial forecasts contain forward-
looking information and interim reviews contain many estimates)? 
Further research is needed to address these questions. 
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Another implication of the study relates to the ranking of 
assurance levels. The results suggest that the level of assurance may 
be related to the audit procedures performed. For the small number of 
LAEs considered, limited substantive testing was perceived to be more 
effective than review procedures. However, many questions remain 
unanswered. How effective are limited substantive testing/review 
procedures (LST/RP)? What type of errors will LST/RP detect? Within 
the category of LST/RP, which particular techniques are most effective? 
Answers to these questions would be helpful in determining the extent to 
which an audit effort reduces the risk of material errors. This 
knowledge is necessary for an eventual construction of a descriptive 
theory about limited assurance engagements. 
Recommendations 
The recommendations made from this study are contingent upon 
whether the auditors or the bankers point of view is assumed. If the 
bankers are "right", then the problem relates to the auditors inability 
to communicate effectively. Conversely, if the auditors are "right", 
then the focal point of the problem lie_s with the bankers lack of 
knowledge about what the auditors are saying. The choice of viewpoint 
necessarily involves a value judgment. The following recommendations 
are made from the auditors perspective, 
A facile recommendation would be to suggest user education 
regarding the meaning of financial forecasts and interim review 
reports. However, this would simply be fighting a brushfire. A more 
comprehensive approach is needed. A suggested synopsis is: 
1. Establish overall objectives and concepts that can be 
used to provide future direction for limited assurance 
engagements. 
2. Establish general standards regarding minimum requirements 
for engagement acceptance, auditor competency and information 
auditability. 
3. Establish levels of assurance which can be easily 
communicated. 
4. Establish a reporting system which adequately conveys 
the intended level of assurance. 
5. Examine and revise existing pronouncements in light 
of the above criteria. 
6. Embark upon a program to educate CPA's and users. 
45 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Commission on 
Auditors' Responsibilities. Report, Conclusions, and Recommenda-
tions. New York: AICPA, 1978. 
Arnold, Jerry L. and Michael A. Diamond. The Market for Compilation, 
Review, and Audit Services. American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (December 1981). 
Bailey, Larry P. "Secondary Level Assurances." The CPA Journal, 
(February 1978), 27-31. 
Brown, Paul R. "A Descriptive Analysis of Select Input Basis of the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board." Journal of Accounting 
Research, 19 (Spring 1981), 232-246. 
Carmichael, D.R. "The Assurance Function -- Auditing at the Crossroads." 
Journal of Accountancy, (September 1974), 64-72. 
Carroll, J. Douglas and Phipps Arabie. "Multidimensional Scaling." 
Annual Review of Psychology, 31 (1980), 607-649. 
Carroll, J. D. and J. J. Chang. "Analysis of Individual Differences in 
Multidimensional Scaling Via an N-way Generalization of 'Eckart-
Young' Decomposition." Psychometrika, 35 (1970), 283-320. 
Green, Paul E. and Donald S. Tull. Applied Multidimensfonal Scaling: 
A Comparison of Approaches and Algorithms. New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1972. 
Green, Paul E. and Vithala R. Rao. Research for Marketing Decisions. 
4th Ed. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1978. 
Hicks, E. L. "Should the Audit Function be Expanded?" Corporate 
Financial Reporting: The Benefits and Problems of Disclosure. 
D. R. Carmichael and B. Makela, eds.-, New York, AICPA, 1976. 
Horan, C. B. "Multidimensional Scaling: Combining Observations When 
Individuals Have Different Perceptual Structures." Psychometrika, 
34 (1969), 139-165. 
Hylas, Robert E. and Robert H. Ashton. "Audit Detection of Financial 
Statement Errors." The Accounting Review, (October 1982), 751-765. 
46 
Johnson, D. A., K. Pany, and R. White. "Audit Reports and the Loan 
Decision: Actions and Perceptions." Auditing-A Journal of 
Practice and Theory, (Spring 1983), 38-51. 
Johnson, Richard M. "Political Segmentation." Paper presented at 
Spring Conference on Research Methodology, American Marketing 
Association, New York, 1969. 
Kruskal, J.B. and M. Wish. Multidimensional Scaling. Beverly Hills: 
Sage, 1978. 
47 
Libby, Robert. "Bankers' and Auditors' Perceptions of the Message 
Communicated by the Audit Report." Journal of Accounting Research, 
17 (Spring 1979), 99-122. 
Maccallum, R. C. "Effects on INDSCAL of Nonorthogonal Perceptions of 
Object Space Dimensions." Psychometrika, 41 (1976), 177-188. 
McGarraugh, C. T. "Accountants, Bankers and Credibility -- The ABC's 
of Capitalism." The Journal of Commercial Bank Lending, (July 
1978), 3-12. 
Milburn, J. Alex. "Limited Audit Engagements and the Expression of 
Negative Assurance." The Canadian Institute of Chartered 
Accountants, 1980. 
Pany, K. and C.H. Smith. "Auditor Association with Quarterly Financial 
Information: An Empirical Test." Journal of Accounting Research, 
(Autumn 1982), 472-482. 
Reckers, P. M. J. and K. Pany. "Quarterly Statement Reliability and 
Auditors Association." Journal of Accountancv, (October 1979), 
97-100. 
Rockness, H. O. and L. A. Nikolai. "An Assessment of APB Voting 
Patterns." Journal of Accounting Research, (Spring 1977), 154-167. 
Schiffman, Susan, M. Lance Reynolds and Forrest Young. Introduction to 
Multidimensional Scaling: Theory, Methods and Applications. 
New York: Academic Press, 1981. 
Schonemann, P.H. "An Algebraic Solution for a' Class of Subjective 
Metrics Models." Psychometrika, 37 (1972), 441-451. 
Schonemann, P.H., F. S. Carter, and W. L. James. "Contributions to 
Subjective Metrics Scaling: I. COSPA, a Fast Method for Fitting 
and Testing Horan's Model, and an Empirical Comparison with 
INDSCAL and ALSCAL." Institute Paper No. 587, Purdue University, 
Krannert Graduate School, 1976. 
Schonemann, P.H., W. L. James, and F. S. Carter. "Statistical 
Inference in Multidimensional Scaling: A Method for Fitting and 
Testing Horan's Model." Geometric Representation of Relational 
Data. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Mathesis Press, (1979), 791-829. 
48 
Snedecor, George W. and William G. Cochran. Statistical Methods. 
Iowa: The Iowa State University Press, 1980. 
Stanners, Robert F., James M. Price, and Scott Painton. "Interrelation-
ships Among Text Elements in Fictional Prose." Applied 
Psycholinguistics, 3 (1982), 95-107. 
Takane, Y., F. W. Young, and J. Deleeuw. "Nonmetric Individual 
Differences Multidimensional Scaling: An Alternative Least 
Squares Method with Optimal Scaling Features." Psychometrika, 
42 (1975), 7-67. 
Torgerson, Warren S. Theory and Methods of Scaling. New York: John 
Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967. 
Wallace, Wanda. The Economic Role of the Audit in Free and Regulated 
Markets. University of Rochester Graduate School of Management, 
1980. 
Winters, Alan J. "An Analysis of Professional Standards for Limited 
Assurance Engagements." Unpublished Position Paper prepared for 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1982. 
Various authoritative pronouncements of the American Institute of 




TYPES OF LIMITED ASSURANCE ENGAGEMENTS CURRENTLY 
ESTABLISHED IN PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS 
1. Letters for underwriters (comfort letters) -- SAS 38 
2. Application of agreed-upon procedures to specific accounts, 
elements, or items of a financial statement -- SAS 35 
3. Application of agreed-upon procedures to financial statements 
taken as a whole -- SAS 26/sec. 504.20 
4. Review of interim financial information of a public entity 
presented alone -- SAS 36 
5. Review of interim financial information that accompanies or is 
included in a note to audited financial statements of public or 
nonpublic companies -- SAS 36 
6. Reviews of interim or annual financial statements of a public 
company that does not have its annual financial statements 
audited -- SAS 26/sec. 504.05 n4 
7. Review of annual or interim financial statements of nonpublic 
entities -- SSARS 1 
8. Reports on compliance with aspects of contractual agreements or 
regulatory requirements related to audited financial statements 
SAS 14/sec. 621 
9. Involvement with supplementary information required by the 
FASB -- SAS 27/sec. 553 
10. Involvement with other information in documents containing audited 
financial statements -- SAS 8/sec. 550 
11. Involvement with explanations of information disclosed in 
accordance with SFAS No. 33 -- SAS 28/sec. 554.04 
12. Involvement with information accompanying basic financial state-
ments in auditors-submitted documents -- SAS 29/sec. 551 
13. Association with unaudited financial statements of public 
entities -- SAS 26/sec. 504 
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14. Compilation of financial statements of nonpublic entities -- SSARS 1 
15. Report on internal accounting control based solely on a study and 
evaluation made as part of an audit of the financial statements --
SAS 30/sec. 642 
16. Report on internal accounting control based on criteria established 
by regulatory agencies -- SAS 30/sec. 642 
17. Reports on certain aspects of administrative control or on com-
pliance with certain provisions in contracts or regulations --
SAS 30/sec. 642 
18. Other special purpose reports on internal accounting control --
SAS 30/sec. 642 
19. Reviews of financial forecasts -- Guide for a Review of a Financial 
Forecast* 
20. Reports on condensed financial statements and selected financial 
data -- SAS 42 
Note: Interestingly, 11 of the 43 Statements on Auditing Standards 
pertain, at least partially, to limited assurance engagements. In 
addition, five Statements on Standards for Accounting and Review 
Services (SSARS) have been issued. 
*The current guide is being revised and will address reporting on 
financial forecasts and projections in both review and compilation 
engagements. 
Source: Winters, Alan J., "An Analysis of Professional Standards for 
Limited Assurance Engagements," Unpublished Paper, AICPA. 
APPENDIX B 
EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUMENT 
The audit report is the focal point of the communication process 
between the auditor and the loan officer. However, we know little about 
what auditors intend to communicate when they issue different types of 
limited assurance reports and even less about the message loan officers 
receive. The objective of this study is to provide a detailed 
description and comparison of auditors' intentions and loan officers' 
perceptions of the message contained in different limited assurance 
reports. 
Other auditors and commercial loan officers will receive these same 
questions concerning the meaning of different reports. For each group 
of participants, statistical techniques will be used to measure 
perceptions of the meaning of the reports. Then, the auditors' and loan 
officers' perceptions will be compared for consistency. 
The results of this research should aid in improving communication 
between auditors and loan officers in a number of ways. A detailed 
description of the meaning of different reports will provide a basis for 
both groups to jointly evaluate the present reporting system. The 
finding of any differences in perceptions will provide part of the 
foundation necessary for the development of more detailed reporting 
criteria or educational programs for users which may reduce the 
differences. The detailed specification of the meaning of different 
reports will also serve as a useful training aid for novice auditors and 
loan officers. 
The responses of all participants will remain anonymous and no 
individual participant or firm will be identified with any specific 
result. The validity of this research and its contribution to the 
accounting and banking professions depends upon your cooperation. 
The task you will be requested to perform should take approximately 




On the following page are examples of eight standard reports issued 
in connection with different limited assurance engagements. Please 
familiarize yourself with these reports until it is easy for you to 
associate the type of report with its abbreviated title. You will be 
asked to rate the similarity of assurance intended by each of 28 pairs 
of reports. You may refer back to these reports whenever necessary. 
Kt:l'OH1' I: INTt:KIM Kt:Vlt:W-1'11111.11" t:NTITY 
Wrr ha11e ffletM • ttvtl'w ul IM' finanri•l •tatrrment• ul All(" r ..... ,,.,., aNll ,·unaolid.ted •uh•idi•rtl'• •"' 
,.# Sc-1.trml,n lU, 19111, .td '4...- 1h .. thrn·munlh a1Ki IHne-,nunth pniuda lht-n rtrtdrd, Ml •CUl'd•Me wilh 
,-111nri•rd1 utabliahrd hy thf' An, .. ,tc'an lnMitutl' o( r .. nilie4 Puhlic' AccuunlantL 
A tnir• ,, N'IIC'ri111 ftu••·UII iofonnat ion a:N1'1i11,la 1trilll'ip•ly •• nf11 ainin,; 8h undrnt .nd"'I ul the- •r•IHI 
J,., 1lw .,,-•11Matklll of inll'rifll finant·Ntl infunNt"""- •1t1•l1int: analJ1inl rn•• f"'IIC:irduru tufinenc-i..l da1, and 
m•kin,: ihffttirin ul pN111u11a naponaihlf, IOC' lin ... K·iail and «ftNltlin« tllallrn. h iA autt11an1:Yly t.,11 HI wu~ 
than an uarniu.cion in arrotdalk'I' wilh 1nwran,· an·efllrtd Mtditint: Mandard, dw uhjcctiwe c,{ which ill tM 
nptl'Hirtn nf all opiniun n1..-dinc dw fin.Mi.I 1tateRtenta ...... ,.Ha whol.. Accordin1lr, •t 4o not UJtlnl 
1uch an opinioft. 
HaHd on nu, n•M'•. we art not a•llf'C ol .ny Malf'rilll Mndif~aliont, lhal 1houkl M twade •• lht 
Kcump•nJin& fi11•Mial ll•ltfflt'Rtl for lht'ffl lo he ill ronfOflllttr-ithCtMHlly KCtplt'. K~nlin& priMipleL 
NEPOIIT2: COMPII.ATION·NONPUBUC ENTITY 
W, Mn C'Otllpiled the accotnpanyinc bal.nce 1hct'I of X.Yl Co.p .. , u ef O.ce1nbet ll.1111 0 MW& the 
r,1.11:d ,,.1,ment1 ol iMOmt, ret.ined Hmin&a. •nd chan&n Ml r1n1Mi_. poailion for tht yHr t"ndtd. i11 
•ccord.,KT with , .. nd•rd11:1tablidted by tht A111•rKH ln1tilule oltertif"te4 Public AccounlantL 
A compi11lkMI ii lh1tited to pt~M"'-inc lft the forM of rMt...dei MlttMfflll infOC'ffl1liofl lh•t ii lht 
rf'prnt"nution of m•n•ce-menL Wt h.ne- not 1utlitH or nritwe4 tht the KCOMp•nrinc fiNnciel 1t11,ment1 
and, .ccordincly, do not Hprt'H an opinion or •nr other fOffll el HMaranc. • thefll. 
Rt:PORT 3: CONTIIACTUAI. COMPLIANCE 
In conMt:tiion with our namin.,tun. nothinc UIIIC tu u11r Mt,ntiua tha1 HU!IC4 1111 to Nll,ve lhat 1M 
l 'om1,.1any wu not in co1npliance- wi1h any ol the ltrma. connents. ~·isiona,. Of condition• of M'diont 2 lo 4, 
inck.t•in, of the lnduturt d•te-d July 21. 1180, with ABC Bank. However, ii ahould be note• that our 
1:umin11ion ... nnl directed prim1rily toward obt..ininc ltnowltdce ol euch aoMompliantt. · 
REPORT4:SUPPL£MENTAIIYINFOIIMATION 
Tiw 1uppleraenUI}' inlormattofton pa1e 2l i, nae• r~d pat of the belie financial llaleMetlt• but i1 
M.lppl,rmenu.ry inlonn•lion ""llllitrd by the finlnd~ A~ S1.1ncl.d1 Boenl. W1 heve 1ppHtd c.r1ain 
limitt-d proc,rduns, which comi1ted principally al NM11tirie1 al MIMIIMtM n1ardinc the 1111lhod1 of 
measure.enl •nd pruentaOon ol tM aupplem,nt.ry lnfonnatio& HownH." dld NI audit the Wonnation 
and npnN no opinion on it. 
•(U lM tupplunenllf}' information ii included witll the b1aic r~ llale ... 111&. • Mparale npotl 
would not nonn1Uy IM issued. The nportin1 '90t.lld be on .. e,cept.MMI k•la. that ii. the WonneUO.would only 
M 1Hntione-d ii Lt~re •er• • probleftl.l 
REPOIIT &: STANDAII.D OPINION 
W • have es..-ined the bi lance 1hfft of X C0tnpeny .. of PttnllMr 3 t. 1181. and the nlat,4 1l.at11nenU 
uf income, RUine4 eamin11 •nd chanSH Ill Rnenrial poeitioll for the ,-a, lh111 ended. Our eaemln1lion w11 
made in l«'"OC'dance with ceMully KCtpted 1Uditinc lll1ndard1 and. eceordinctr. Included IUCh lHll of 
tM 1crounlin& record• and such other auditinc proctduR1 u we comlden4 lttttH..-Y III the drcumatancH. 
In our opinina,, the finenclal 1laltmenl1 t1ferre4 10 eboff prennl falrt, lht financial potltloft of X 
Company•• ol Otter11ber ll, 1981, and 1h, retulll of ita opentioM and the chall&H HI Ill financ&.I po1ition 
for the yHr then ended. in confonnity with cenerally .cttpted a"1Hllltinc principltt applied °" • b11il 
corui11tnl with that ol the prurdinc rur. 
llt:l'OHT 8: CflNUt:NStll t"INANCIAI. STATEMENTS 
Wr hoe eun,int:d, in accurd,nn •1th 1t:nf'ull,- acnpud auditin11t.and11da. tht: con.olid•l•d b1lann 
"hHI nf X l'ump,n)' and 1uh1idiuiu II of (ll:nnitMr 31, 1180, and the related conaolid1i.d 1t.ala'menu of 
inc:oml', re11int:d l'atnin11. 1""1 ch1n,:1:1 in financial pu1i1ion for the year 1hen tnded I not preNn .. d IMnin); and 
in uuf reJll..rl d11td f'el,n,ary U, 1981, •e uprentd an unqu•lificd opinion on. I.hon condida .. d (U\llnriaJ 
•l•temenla. In our opinion. the infurm•lion Ml lurth in the ec:companyin1 condtnud coneolid114d rUtanci&I 
•laltmtnla i1 fairly 1l1ted in 111 m1lerial rt:1~cll in rtl11ion lo the con,olidat.ed (1n.anci.al 1t.tem•nU from wNCI. 
;, hH hun derived 
KEPORT 1: AGREED UPON PIIOCEDUIIES 
We hau·1pplicd nn.ain a1reed·upon procedures. 11 dilaiaaed below, IA lM account.ins l"K'Of"d• ol 
ABC Company II ol June lO, 1992, IO 11ai1t you in conMction with your propoHd lo.la 1.CfNmHt with the 
Second N11Kfnal 8ank.. h i1 to be understood that thi1 report .. dcly fot Lhe information ol the ABC Compa.aJ 
ind lhe Stcond National Bink. and our report i1 not to bt uN4i for any other purpoH. Our prooduru u,d 
findins• Ill: •• fotlow1: 
tat Wt obtained an a1cd trial balance of the acC'OUnta rtctiveble 1ub1idill)' r-.cord111 of June 30, I 182, 
tnced the a1• and amount.I of appro1imately 10 pe:tcenc of.the 1ccounu IO the account.a nc•iY1bl.e 
&.d1er, and added the trial balance and complftd the IOI.al with lhe balance ln the CHM1nl l•dc., 
control accounL 
(bt We m1ilrd requuta for poailiv, confvmation ol b.lancea IO l f.0 cual0m•r1.. Th• diffenon• 
diuloaed in confUl'Dattoft npliH •en minor in amount •nd natw't, and •• n-conciled lhem IO 
our 11ti1faction. 
Becauae lht 1bowe procectur .. do ·not conHitute an e11mination ·•adt in 1ccordanc. wkb 11:aeraD, 
accepted auditin1 atandal"ds. we do not 1t1pnu an opinion on any of the account,, or items refen-ed lO 1bow1.. 
111 connection. with the proc,durH referred t.o 1bov1:, no mallen came lO out attention that cau,ed. 111 to belie..-, 
that tht 1pecifMd accounts ot item• ahould be adjusted. Had we performed additional proce-durn at bad•~ 
1r1ade an n1•ination _ol the financial 1Ulementa in accordance with 1enenUr accept.d audiciAt: .t.aAd.a.rck 
mattrn •i1ht haw, corae to our allention that •°"Id have bee• npor\ed IO you. 'nus nport relit.a oaly &o 
the a«ounta and items apecirttd above and d0t"1 not ntend lo any r1nandal 1tallmen1.1 of ABC Compl,Qy, takn 
111 whole. 
IIEPORT 8: FINANCIAL FOIIECASTS 
1lw accompanyinc foncutt"d 81lanc, Sheel. Stat11Mnt.1·ot 1ncome;Retawd Eamin(1 and Cbanc:•• UI 
Financial Poaitioft and Sulll\...,.,. of aisnif1c:1111 foRcaat auumpt.ion1 ol XYZ Compe.ny u of December JI, l H l, 
ind for tM year endin1, i11nana1a-ment'1 Htimate ol the raoat probable rmanci.al poailioa., naWu ol O(M'rat:ioo.. 
and chianct1 in f1111ncW position for the fo.-ec111 period. Accordinsly, the f<>RC11l nfl.cw •.,..c•mea(1 
fudcmtnl. baa~d on preunt cittu .. 1tancu, ot tM 1na.t lllta-ly Ml ol condil.ion.a 111d kl 11t01t lili:ely COWM ol 
Ktioft. 
W • have made I review of the the financial lore-cut in e«ordance 9\lh applicable ruid•liM• for a nrie-• 
of a financial lor,cut Hllbli1hed by lhc Ama-rican ln1litule of CertirMd Public Accou.nt&Dtl (AlCPA). Ou.r 
rnie• includrd proc:edun, to t"Hluat.t both the anumptiona uud by man11cmenl 111d the pnpantion and 
preunt•tion of the fora-ca,L We havt no r1:1pon1ibilit)' 10 updatc lhi1 nport for ennll and cil'cum1t&nc-H 
occun-in1 after the d1t• of thi. Rport.. 
Baaed on our rnitw, we be1M:ve lhat lM accompanJinc financial forecut ia preunt..d la coalocm.ity wiUI 
•Prlicabl, suidelinH to, prnent.ation of a financial fottc11t 11tabU1hed by the A.JCPA. Wt beline th.at Iha 
undtrl)'inl 111ump.lion1 provide a reuonabla- b11i1 for ma1111ement'1 fonc11l However, tome a.uumptio61 
inevillhlr will not rnateri1liH and unanlidpattd ,,..enll and clrcunutencu may occur; th.rwfon, I.be tctual 
rnuh1 ,chined durin& the foteca1t period will wary from the fonc11t. and the nrialion m•J be mat.anal 
Instructions: For each of the following pairs of reports, please 
rate the similarity of the implied assurance. The ratings will be made 
on a nine-point scale labeled from very similar (1) to not very 
similar (9). Ties are allowed and you may go back and change previous 
answers. It is important that you spread your evaluations over the 
scale and that you make your judgments on a relative basis. It is a 
good idea to scan the list of pairs before you begin to get a general 
idea of how to use the scale. Please evaluate all 28 pairs in a 
conscientious manner. 
very similar 
1 2 3 4 
Condensed Financial Statements 




~~Condensed Financial Statements 
Interim Review-Public Entity 




~~Interim Review-Public Entity 
Compilation-Nonpublic Entity 
~~Standard Opinion 
Agreed Upon Procedures 





not very similar 
6 7 8 9 
Contractual Compliance 
Agreed Upon Procedures 




Agreed Upon Procedures 
~~Compilation-Nonpublic Entity 
Financial Forecasts 
~~Agreed Upon Procedures 
Contractual Compliance 
~~Interim Review-Public Entity 
Standard Opinion 









~~Condensed Financial Statements 
Condensed Financial Statements 
~~Standard Opinion 




Condensed Financial Statements 
~~Contractual Compliance 
· Supplementary Information 
~~Agreed Upon Procedures 
Contractual Compliance 
~~Compilation-Nonpublic Entity 






Instructions: For each of the following five questions, please 
indicate the degree to which you feel it is applicable for each report. 
You may indicate your answer by circling the number you feel is most 
appropriate on a ten-point scale. It is important to note the endpoints 
printed above each scale because they indicate the direction of the 
scale. As before, ties are allowed and you may change previous answers. 
Try to avoid developing a pattern of responses. Be sure to respond to 
all scales. 
1. For each of the following reports, to what extent did the auditor 
test the accounting records? 
Extensive tests No tests 
Interim Review-Public Entity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Compilation-Nonpublic Entity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Condensed Financial Statements 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Supplementary Information 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Financial Forecasts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Contractual Compliance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Agreed Upon Procedures 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Standard Opinion 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2. For each of the following reports, to what extent does the report 
represent that the accompanying financial information does not 
contain misleading information? 
Full representation No representation 
Interim Review-Public Entity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Compilation-Nonpublic Entity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Condensed Financial Statements 1 2- 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Supplementary Information 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Financial Forecasts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Contractual Compliance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Agreed Upon Procedures 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Standard Opinion 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
57 
3. For each of the following reports, to what extent should a third 
party expect to recover a financial loss from the auditor if he 
could prove reliance on the report? 
High expectation Low expectation 
of recovery of recovery 
Interim Review-Public Entity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Compilation-Nonpublic Entity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Condensed Financial Statements 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Supplementary Information 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Financial Forecasts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Contractual Compliance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Agreed Upon Procedures 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Standard Opinion 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
4. For each of the following reports, to what extent should a third 
party rely upon the report in making a financial lending decision? 
Much addit,ional Little additional 
information needed information needed 
Interim Review-Public Entity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7. 8 9 10 
Compilation-Nonpublic Entity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Condensed Financial Statements 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Supplementary Information 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Financial Forecasts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Contractual Compliance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Agreed Upon Procedures 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Standard Opinion 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
58 
5. For each of the following reports, to what extent is the underlying 
information of the report susceptible to unintentional misstatement? 
Very susceptible Not susceptible 
Interim Review-Public Entity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Compilation-Nonpublic Entity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Condensed Financial Statements 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Supplementary Information 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Financial Forecasts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Contractual Compliance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Standard Opinion i 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Agreed Upon Procedures 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
APPENDIX C 
AUDITORS I DATA 
Auditors' Data Auditors' Data 
using the using the 
Auditors' Bankers' Squared 
Coordinates Coordinates Difference Deviation Deviation 
Pair Xl X2 D=Xl-X2 d=D-D d2 
1 .48 .51 -.03 -. 1312 .0172134 
2 .54 .38 .16 .0588 .0034574 
3 .29 .44 -.15 -.2512 .0631014 
4 .76 .52 .24 .1388 .0192654 
5 .66 .62 .04 -.0612 .0037454 
6 • 43 .34 .09 -.0112 .0001254 
7 .81 .58 .23 .1288 .0165894 
8 .45 .45 -.1012 .0102414 
9 • 77 .46 .31 .2088 .0435974 
10 .42 .28 .14 .0388 .0015054 
11 .59 .31 .28 .1788 .0319694 
12 .55 .33 .22 .1188 • 0141134 
13 .57 .40 .17 .0688 .0047334 
14 .64 .65 -.01 -.1112 .0123654 
15 .55 .59 -.04 -.1412 .0199374 
16 .47 .49 -.02 -.1212 .0146894 
17 .39 .25 .14 .0388 .0015054 
18 .30 • 14 .16 .0588 .0034574 
19 .56 .57 -.01 -.1112 .0123654 
20 .46 .44 .02 -.0812 .0065934 
21 .55 .45 .10 -.0012 .0000014 
22 .56 .46 .10 -.0012 • 0000014 
23 .37 .23 .14 .0388 .0015054 
24 .44 .38 .06 -.0412 .0016974 
25 .65 .46 .19 .0888 .0078854 
13 .26 10.73 2.53 0 .311664 
X1=.5304 x2=.4292 D= .1012 
2 . 311664 2 .012986 
s = D 24 .012986 s- = D 25 = .0005194 
s- = D .0227912 
59 
t=D/SD= .1012/.0227912 = 4.4403052 
T l =4.4403052 ca c 
T l 24=3.745 .oo ' 





Bankers' Data Bankers' Data 
using the using the 
Bankers' Auditors' Squared 
Coordinates Coordinates Difference Deviation Deviation 
Pair Xl X2 D=x1:...x2 d=D-D d2 
1 .56 .39 .17 .098 • 009604 
2 .51 .44 .07 -.002 .000004 
3 .30 .43 -.13 -.202 .040804 
4 .31 .24 .07 -.002 .000004 
5 .68 .47 .21 .138 .019044 
6 .33 .31 .02 -.052 .002704 
7 .55 .38 .17 .098 • 009604 
8 .70 • 72 -.02 -.092 .008464 
9 .45 .53 -.08 -.152 • 023104 
10 .74 .44 .30 .228 .051984 
11 .50 .43 .07 -.002 .000004 
12 .56 .50 .06 -.012 .000144 
13 .25 .13 .12 .048 .002304 
14 .32 .40 -.08 -.152 .023104 
15 .64 .44 .20 .128 .016384 
16 .22 .37 -.15 -.222 .049284 
17 .39 .38 .01 -.062 .003844 
18 .53 .30 .23 .158 .024964 
19 .43 .39 .04 -.032 . 001024 
20 .53 .43 .10 .028 .000784 
21 .52 .27 .25 .178 .031684 
22 .53 .34 .19 .118 .013924 
23 .49 .56 -.07 -.142 .020164 
24 .79 .78 .01 -.062 .003844 
25 .37 .33 .04 -.032 .001024 
12.20 10.4 1.8 0 .3578 
x 1=.488 X2=.416 D=.072 
2 .3578 2 .0149083 




T l =2.9484105 ca c 
T. 05 , 24=2.064 
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